11.02.2009 - On "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" by David J. Chalmers

Gilles Kuhn: hello indigo panda Kidd: Hello Gilles Kuhn: hello panda panda Kidd: I'm a member in Kira Japan and I'm making a movie to introduce about KIRA so If you don't mind, I want to take pictures and movie. Can I take movie about your Philosophical Seminary workshop? Gilles Kuhn: ah yes gen send me a mail about you welcome ! panda Kidd: Thank you very much! Gilles Kuhn: you can I’m flattered ! panda Kidd: Do you use voice chat? TH Ordinary: hello Gilles Kuhn: no only written chat TH Ordinary: yes panda Kidd: Ok, thank you. Gilles Kuhn: hello Scathach welcome Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Gilles:) Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Panda panda Kidd: Hello Gilles Kuhn: hello mickrorod hello myna Mickorod Renard: good evening Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Mickorod:) Mickorod Renard: how are you? Gilles Kuhn: fine and you? Mickorod Renard: hiya scath panda Kidd: Good evening Mickorod Renard: fine ty Myna Maven: Hi Giles, Mick, Scath, Panda, Yicahrd. Gilles Kuhn: hello yichard Mickorod Renard: hi pand Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Yichard Gilles Kuhn: hello myna Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Myna:) Yichard Muni: hello all :-) Mickorod Renard: I did the homework Gilles, but I man need another month to get to grips with it Gilles Kuhn: lol mickrorod this place is too about to help understand the text we work on don’t hesitate to ask question to all Gilles Kuhn: hello quen quen Oh: hello Gilles, hi all Myna Maven: Hello Quen. Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Quen panda Kidd: Hello Quen Pema Pera: Hi there, everybody! Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Pema:) Myna Maven: Hi Pema. Pema Pera: Hi Panda, good to see you here! Gilles Kuhn: hello Pema quen Oh: hello Pema, Myna, panda, Scathach! panda Kidd: Hello,Pema. panda Kidd: Good to see you! Mickorod Renard: hi Pema Gilles Kuhn: hey gen! genesis Zhangsun: Hey Gilles! Yichard Muni: hmmmm... why is there a fire extinguisher in there? Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Gen, Fefonz:) Gilles Kuhn: hello Fefonz nice to see you Myna Maven: Hello Gen, Fefonz. Pema Pera: long story, Yichard. . . we had a fire here, long ago Lia Rikugun: hello panda Kidd: lol Scathach Rhiadra: Hello Lia:) Myna Maven: Hello Lia. Gilles Kuhn: well ladies pandas and gentlemen we will begin Fefonz Quan: Hello everybody :) Mickorod Renard: hi felonz Fefonz Quan: wow Panda, it's a nice panacota there :) Yichard Muni: I have a larger hat than you, Panda :-) Gilles Kuhn: so last time we had an interesting discussion about the notion of covariation of chalmers intermixed with the notion of X or sense of Piet Pema Pera: note that our discussions will be recorded on our wiki also, today as an exception for a promotional movie for Kira Panda Kidd will make a few movie fragments Gilles Kuhn: and on the net and logged on our Google group panda Kidd: Hello Pema Pera: hope that is okay for everybody -- this is your chance to be an extra! quen Oh (will revert to a more decent sitball) Pema Pera: hehehe Gilles Kuhn: so put your more presentable outfit on :-) Mickorod Renard: I would have combed my hair had I have known Pema Pera: (perhaps Gilles will turn into a sheep. . . ) Gilles Kuhn: somebody can brush my fur? :-) Gilles Kuhn: (already done that let not lie more :-)) ) Pema Pera: :-) Pema Pera: Gilles is a sheep in wolf's clothes . . . . Gilles Kuhn: so let focus my ladies pandas and lords! quen Oh: both sheep and wolves have nice soft and cuddly furs Pema Pera: cuddly qualia Gilles Kuhn: the concept of covariance that we introduced with chalmers paper as a big relation to the old big hard hard problems in consciousness studies namely qualias quen Oh grins Pema Pera: (what Chalmers calls "invariance", Gilles?) Gilles Kuhn: so as it entered the debate i mentioned the paper of chalmers that I will try to introduce to our debate tonight absent qualia fading and dancing one Gilles Kuhn: covariance Pema Yichard Muni: hmm... sorry, all, but it is late for me. I shall read the wiki instead :-) bye quen Oh: bye Yichard Gilles Kuhn: the idea that neural or other functional system covary relatively to qualic or first person impression Scathach Rhiadra: bye Yichard Fefonz Quan: bye Yich Yichard Muni: sounds interesting, though, I did not knew chalmers studied the problem so far. bye Fefonz Quan: Hi arabElla Pema Pera: (sorry, Gilles, the paper today only mentioned invariance . . . was that last week's paper then, about covariance?) Pema Pera: ((just want to make sure I understand the terms)) Gilles Kuhn: so in the paper that i want to introduce now chalmers make a point about functionalism the idea that similar functional system will "create" the same effect arabella Ella: hiya Gilles Kuhn: (yes Pema last week covariance) Pema Pera: (((sorry!))) Gilles Kuhn: (np at all) Gilles Kuhn: the paper of chalmers is in fact a defence of functionalism quen Oh: how can we be sure we have the same system and nothing is left out? Gilles Kuhn: the idea that equivalent in their causal organisation system will give birth to the same result at ALL level including conscious one including qualic one Gilles Kuhn: that’s the big central problem of the argument quen quen Oh grins arabella Ella: so you mean that as long as there is input and output then the processes do not matter at all, whether it is silicon chips or neurons? Gilles Kuhn: by hypothesis (chalmers use a thought experiment well various one ) chalmers say that the physical organization of a system if it preserve all functional capability is equivalent whatever the material if you want Gilles Kuhn: yes thats basically chalmers argument arabella arabella Ella: but then what is the equivalence, in the input and output or in the processes in between input and output? Gilles Kuhn: there is a postulate in chalmers thought experiment: in what we call here as 3 person perspective the result WILL be the same arabella Ella: it sounds very similar to behaviorism if you ask me arabella Ella: functionalism seems to have a lot in common with stimulus response, input and output Gilles Kuhn: in layman words if as the thought experiment goes we slowly replace internal component with component that realize the same task at a basic level of organization (not very evident in chalmers paper btw) then the global behaviour of the system externally will be the same AND following chalmers arguments there will be no reason to think the internal impression (1 person) of the system would be different either Gilles Kuhn: and indeed there is a big influence of behaviorism in the third person perspective of the reasoning quen Oh: you could say the same for 2 totally different person getting the same input and hypothetically having the exact same output? Gilles Kuhn: no because the a priori postulate would be two exactly the same person Scathach Rhiadra: how can you have two exactly the same persons? arabella Ella: don't you mean yes Gilles? rather than no? TR Amat: Personally, I'd have big problems with the idea that you could precisely replace a component with an equivalent. arabella Ella: functionalism is not interested with what happens in the process of thinking at all Gilles Kuhn: the trick and in my opinion strength and weakness of the thought experiment reside in the idea that functionally material organizational and perceived things cannot be so easily distinguished quen Oh: we would have 2 different persons, apparently processing the input to the same outcome, not necessarily using the same system... arabella Ella: yes Quen like coming up with a new invention TR Amat: Is part of the question "close enough" then? Gilles Kuhn: actually in chalmers argument we will have the same person but he don’t speak in person term but in functional system input output indeed and infer that internal perception have no reason to be different Gilles Kuhn: and for that he use a progressive argument same kind of sextus empiricus argument about incest...... quen Oh is not sure she understands, it seems that it says something anything about material organization and the perception of that organization... we see only input, output and some material organization... Gilles Kuhn: if you touch the toe of you mother no problem but if you move slowly up..... etc. and finally you got incest..... quen Oh: (minus something) TR Amat: Quite a lot of what conditions the output is experience/memory, so, you would need to duplicate that as well in your new components? Fefonz Quan: what Gilles? Quintessential Sorbet: Good evening....is this open to join? Fefonz Quan: (sorry, I read insect :)) quen Oh: welcome Quintessential Quintessential Sorbet: thank you :-) Gilles Kuhn: the inferred postulate of chalmers is that all memories and conscious and unconscious mind is result of the physical system that is the brain (i tend to agree but that can be discussed) Gilles Kuhn: yes quintessential welcome Gilles Kuhn: and so are qualic experience Gilles Kuhn: following him arabella Ella: so is all there is to it external behavior with no importance given to internal processes ... what about personal thoughts or anguish? Some peoples experience that, others don’t ... we are not machines Gilles Kuhn: its quite a different position as the position of Pema that for epistemic reason take conscious experience as the primitive Pema Pera: but the two could be complementary Pema Pera: different levels of description like water and molecules or a movie story and light of the projector Gilles Kuhn: yes ara but if you have exactly the same neurons and the same neurons state will you not experience exactly the same thing? and are we not "machine" are we not bound to material things ? because of not what? dualism? quen Oh: also all consciousness is heavily intertwined with past experience (and based on that expectations, frameworks to understand etc) Fefonz Quan: it doesn't say that it is not physical-dependant Gilles Kuhn: yes Fefonz he say that is physically dependent but that physically equivalent organizational processes can no will give birth to the same phenomena i.e. qualia arabella Ella: well if you are an inventor it is very difficult to quantify or describe what the input is for two peoples but the output could be identical ... but we have no guarantee that the internal processes if they interest us are the same Fefonz Quan would like to enforce quen's point, you can have similar inputs but with a totally different state on the inner state machine arabella Ella: I tend to agree with Pema (following Searle too) that you can have different levels of description (Davidson too) Gilles Kuhn: and yes Pema but if you have a projector using different technologies that projec t the same thing? is it not the same as functionalism ? quen Oh: the abstract body so to speak a 'past' of the conscious system would form, you cannot exclude I think… will make it problematic to compare different conscious systems (whether human or robot or else) Fefonz Quan worked for years trying to align projectors color presentation... Gilles Kuhn: yes quen but these past memories are not embedded in a physical system? Pema Pera: I just meant to say that two different kinds of "explanations" are not necessarily contradictory Gilles Kuhn: right Pema at an epistemic level i agree fully Pema Pera: the lamp shines because I flip the switch -- or because I paid the bill -- or because I screwed in a bulb -- and so on quen Oh agrees that this 'body' is at least heavily dependent on a physical system indeed Gilles Kuhn: yes but if you don’t do one of these Pema the light go not on arabella Ella: yes Pema Davidson says you could have a physical description of a mental event or a physical description of the same event although one is subservient on the other quen Oh: it only complicates matters when you want to distinguish how this physical system functions TR Amat: Isn't one problem that too low a level of description tends to not be able of handling some concepts, maybe like thinking on the level of atoms when you are concerned about the color of something? Pema Pera: flipping a switch may be like Chalmer's argument while the existence of electricity itself may be more on the level of what I talked about -- but we would have to be more precise, I agree Pema Pera: yes, TR! Pema Pera: so the logic of projecting a movie is one kind of logic; the logic of shooting a movie is another -- what you see is based on both Gilles Kuhn: I actually thing (I tried to put on chalmers point means not i fully agree with him ) that indeed there is no reason to think that consciousness is bound to happen only in biological system but even if it can principally happen in other that in both case don’t explain why or when or how it happen quen Oh: question would be whether the 'abstract body' of past experience that is formed can be found within the material system, to read for others than the system... especially difficult as we seem to be able to at least slightly influence this 'abstract body' by consicous will (but you could argue that is an illusion Gilles) Fefonz Quan: or the abstract body sets our conscious will? TR Amat: I believe there are still issues about where memory actually is in the brain. Though, the parts of the brain responsible for letting down new memories are recognized. Gilles Kuhn: well illusion quen I think and I think Pema will concur that even if qualic conscious experience are illusory they remain fundamental and need to be "explained " and treated as such TR Amat: laying* Storm Nordwind is reminded that the classic and very easy way to beat a chatterbot at a Turing Test experiment is to include contextual references of past experiences. quen Oh nods.. wouldn't know how to determine that Fefonz Pema Pera: but "explanations" depend on context. . . . Fefonz Quan: (there was that experiment... but it's a little off-topic maybe) quen Oh: that would mean Gilles, that I get input I am not aware of which causes me to change my opinion? or that there is contingency in my system which makes my internal thought patterns change route from time to time? Gilles Kuhn: actually what is still the problem and chalmers Piet or me concur is how brain cells physical system (even water pipes or billions of chineses ) can give birth to the full subjective and unified experience that are qualia arabella Ella: So Gilles if you were to take Frank Jackson ' s thought experiment about Mary the color scientist would you say she learnt nothing when she emerged from her black and white environment? Pema Pera: perhaps they don't, Gilles Gilles Kuhn: and yes quen that is very accepted in clinical psychology Quintessential Sorbet: Do you think consciousness is reductionist Gilles? Or reducible? Gilles Kuhn: yes Pema thats a possibility that you try to let open with your sense notion I must say that I have difficulties not with the possibility but to see why it’s not adding a layer of complexity without giving any more light on the problem Quintessential Sorbet: Question being....if we assume consciousness being fully emergent...is there really issue with qualia? TR Amat: Does the idea of emergent phenomena tie into this at all? Gilles Kuhn: to say emergent like a magic word don’t solve anything Quintessential Sorbet: well...it depends if you think emergency exists in a fundamental level TR Amat: The two systems in the thought experiment if sufficiently similar will produce the same emergent behavior? Gilles Kuhn: and ara about mary circumstantial but probably her neural net will not recognize color indeed Quintessential Sorbet: they could TR...take programming for instance...or neural networks....they are not of course conscious...but a definition of a computer program does not take stand what is the platform it is being run Fefonz Quan: but she will know it is new to her, whatever color that is quen Oh: wouldn't Pema's extra layer not explain the impression of free will Gilles? in a context argument, where consciousness doesn't arise from the system itself ... the 'extra layer' relates things, depending on our context, which is past experience but also everything around us and incoming new experience, Gilles Kuhn: well I don’t think we need to search for fundamental level because I think they will always escape us and not only in consciousness studies arabella Ella: but Gilles, when Mary sees color there is no doubt it will give her a new experience ... qualia related ... which science cannot yet explain not in functionalist nor in reductive terms Quintessential Sorbet: oh I would disagree Gilles :-) But I can admit that it might get the discussion slightly off topic Gilles Kuhn: i think that the only thing we can try is to have technical system that permit us to modify at "will" our perception and to create hopefully others Fefonz Quan: Arabelle, you might say her neurons where arranged in a new arrangement due to the new experience Gilles Kuhn: ara if she is color deprived like in the exp she will not develop the neural net necessary to encode color there is conclusive data with chimps in that quen Oh: I wouldn't throw away free will as an unnecessary complicating 'illusion', not Ockham I think Gilles Kuhn: ouch quen free will related but BIG other problem Fefonz Quan: color encoding is done in a way in the eye itself… Gilles Kuhn: no occipital brain Fefonz Fefonz Quan: so the brain will get a new input TR Amat: If you claim that consciousness is a system for modeling the future behavior of the environment, and most of the time we are reacting to what the model predicts, while correcting for mismatching with what actually happens, does that change the nature of the question? Gilles Kuhn: there is a part of it if destroyed will make you color blind Gilles Kuhn: which only say that the function of this part is a necessary condition btw not a sufficient one Fefonz Quan: yes, but the ratios between red and green out coming from the eye will be a new input to the brain Quintessential Sorbet: on the other hand...isn't color blindness just a "response function" to a stimuli? Quintessential Sorbet: Why could a robot not experience color blindness just as well? Fefonz Quan: it is mostly defected sensors Quint Gilles Kuhn: actually these ratio need a part of the occipital brain to "arrive" (don’t ask me how) to a conscious state Mickorod Renard: I am color blind and its been said to be a mutant gene Quintessential Sorbet: Fefonz...it does not matter what the physical system is....I could make a program that is "color blind" :-) Gilles Kuhn: mutant gene can cause functional impairment in your brain Fefonz Quan: it is like saying that if I never saw a boat, my brain won't see it Gilles Kuhn: no Fefonz but if not pointed to you it is possible you don’t recognize it a s a boat Fefonz Quan: and then Quint? Quintessential Sorbet: Like even with humans....I suppose you could be color blind just as well as a hysterical reaction ... Fefonz Quan: Ah, sure I agree with that Gilles. arabella Ella: Fefonz ... Oliver Sacks has a book about a person who was blind and regained his sight and could not recognize ordinary objects but had to learn to distinguish and name them Fefonz Quan: no argue, still he experience "newness" without recognizing TR Amat: If consciousness is a future-modeling thing, then, are the qualia parts of the model being matched to reality? And, so are of necessity part of the system? Gilles Kuhn: but well to refocus let do some kind of poll do you think each of you that a artificial intelligence with the equivalent functional capacity of our brain with a silicon system mimicking perfectly the organization of our brain with all perceptual capacity etc will be conscious, will be experimenting qualia? arabella Ella: well Fefonz ... imagine you were brought up in an inner city and never ever saw a picture of a deer or a fox and were faced with one ... you would recognize them as an animal with four feet but that’s about it Fefonz Quan: right Quintessential Sorbet: Gilles I vote yes....Sorry I came late and you have probably discussed this already....I have not yet understood why would you exactly think that qualia would matter.....My intuition would be that our "operating system" does not care what platform it sits on? quen Oh: exactly ara, I think you need past experience in order to become more and more conscious of present one... it is fascinating how it works though Fefonz Quan: Gilles, I think this is too hypothetic thought Gilles Kuhn: ok Fefonz so abstention? ;-) arabella Ella: my answer is ... depends on your definitions of the basic terms what would you define consciousness as? Gilles Kuhn: ara you’re too much a philosopher like me :) let say qualic awareness arabella Ella: what attributes and capabilities would a conscious person have? arabella Ella smiles Gilles Kuhn: will the thing have qualic experience? Fefonz Quan: lost you, Gilles quen Oh: perhaps no more than to be able to make relations between input and older input? Quintessential Sorbet: ok...of course our future experiences as a "robot" would shape us different than if we were biological beings....on the other hand they would be different even if I went blind like tomorrow Fefonz Quan: does a bat have, Gilles? Gilles Kuhn: yes quen right and can we not be defined as such too? TR Amat: If we duplicate in silicon all the current and future influence of our genes on brain structure, and record all the experiences of that brain in the silicon, I am still not certain that nothing would be lost. Though, I can honestly say I have a great deal of trouble explaining that uncertainty. :) Quintessential Sorbet: Right TR...I see no reason why it could not succeed...in theory=) Gilles Kuhn: mmmh tr my condition were more drastic i was pointing like chalmers to a "artificial " brain only difference neurons are chips but all chips has all the functionality of actual bio neurons TR Amat: That process I describe is what the "uploaders" of the trans/post-humanists talk about. :) Quintessential Sorbet: hmm....arabella does it matter how we define consiouscness (darn...I can't even type the word :-( Gilles Kuhn: yes tr saw that but that go farther way farther btw btu its an interesting point! Fefonz Quan: Gilles, you should add the Gliya around the neurons and so on, so actually, you should build a real brain for that Gilles Kuhn: yes Fefonz it was implicit Gilles Kuhn: chalmers mention it too Archivist Llewellyn: Gilles, cognitive computering at IBM has succeeded in modeling mouse and rat brain functions under a DARPA Grant Storm Nordwind gets the impression that Gilles presupposes that the constructed entity exists in isolation with no interconnection with its context. I doubt that a silicon reconstruction could go beyond that isolation Gilles Kuhn: all functional necessary element Quintessential Sorbet: right Arch....I could believe that Fefonz Quan: so you describe a physical system identical to a brain, but not a human brain&gt;? arabella Ella: Quint ... yes definitions matter a lot ... if consciousness means creative use of language, emotions, planning for the long terms future, senseless or idealistic dreams, then robots are still far off Mickorod Renard: I second storm quen Oh: I think however nice rational and more accessible for explanation a functionalist consciousness system where all would be material cause and effect would be, our daily experience is orthogonal to that, there must be a utility for that too.. we do well living in what you call the 'illusion' of something extra (call it free will, soul, a 'me'...) Gilles Kuhn: storm not the case as brooks say we need to in order to try to implement ia make the ia live in context but in the thought experiment of chalmers we are speaking about your argument is not correct because its integrated in Quintessential Sorbet: ok arabella...of course...but like in detail ...why would they matter here exactly....what makes silicon so different from our brain mass.... Fefonz Quan: and second storm too arabella Ella: one thing in favor of AI and functionalism ... we seem to move the goal posts for what counts as intelligent in machines each time they reach their goals ... imagine a prehistoric person seeing how a robot dog operates today for example Gilles Kuhn: well if you read chalmers thought experiment he begin with a brain in context and change neuron by neuron by silicon chips so the context never change nor is the problem arabella Ella: so similar to Dennett's thought experiment Gilles? TR Amat: There is someone at British Telecom who proposes recording all sense input from birth, on the theory that could be used to recreate someone using a clone if needed. Quintessential Sorbet: ok....we know we can easily move a computer program from one machine to another...what is exactly the property that makes us even doubt that we could not do the same with consciousness Fefonz Quan: Quint, the neurons respond to charges around them and chemicals running in the brain, silicon would act differently TR Amat: Glands? Gilles Kuhn: sense input will not be sufficient you d have to record internal neuronal process as well (probably way more complex btw...) Quintessential Sorbet: functionally not necessarily Fefonz Fefonz Quan: and the brains is much more analog than the digital model loved by AI people Quintessential Sorbet: I doubt that makes difference either....you could argue that our neural network is pretty digital too Fefonz Quan: and you would be wrong Quintessential Sorbet: I think you can make representation either way TR Amat: I think the BT man as claiming that genes+sensory input = person. Gilles Kuhn: "digital" is only a representation of structural, functional, you name it… info Fefonz Quan: yes, but i claim you need to "digitalize" the atomic level in order to get similarity, not the neural, thus coming to physical identity TR Amat: In theory you could model the effect of the chemicals and glands as well, I think. By detecting them, and processing the info. Quintessential Sorbet: no Fefonz...I doubt I would be...the neurons fire signals to each others....but like I said I think you can build a functional representation either way Quintessential Sorbet: analog or digital Quintessential Sorbet: right TR I think so too Pema Pera: I'll have to go now, thanks a lot, Gilles, and everybody! Gilles Kuhn: well as the tradition ask I will have soon to close the formal part of this very very stimulating discussion! but feel free to continue ! Mickorod Renard: bye Pema Lia Rikugun: byebye Fefonz Quan: yes, but the responses of the neurons change every second due to chemicals running in the white matter of the brain around then TR Amat: Brains are a bit messy, and there is likely some "slop", so you don't need to be totally exact. :) Scathach Rhiadra: bye Pema quen Oh: bye Pema! Pema Pera: bye everybody, see you soon Quintessential Sorbet: well...so would a neural network computer do wouldn't it? Gilles Kuhn: bye Pema TR Amat: Bye Pema Archivist Llewellyn: bye Fefonz Quan: sorry, don't know that term Quint TR Amat: Your glucose level affect things, but, you could model that. arabella Ella: can machines be programmed to make mistakes? to act irrationally (as many humans do)? quen Oh: or nicer ara, to be truly creative Fefonz Quan: well, I saw a computer write songs Lia Rikugun: (I have to go too thank you) Gilles Kuhn: that’s the problem of pure functionalism and indeed chalmers thought experiment are a defence of it but I want to add to it that before we in fact don’t REALLY construct a artificial system that seems to be conscious (ok turing problem to know how to assess that ) we will only be making scholastic TR Amat: If you start from a developmental model of consciousness, what happens first? Mickorod Renard: I think from a functional point you could create a robot with either human brain or silicon, but not a human in reverse arabella Ella: well Quen there are authors like Margaret Boden who claim machines can be creative but again it depends on your definition of creativity quen Oh: to see whether that is creative you need to know the input Fefonz... and how he actually is 'renewing' that TR Amat: The child's brain tries to model reality, which bits are immediately controllable, which aren't: self and other? Fefonz Quan didn't claim creativity... quen Oh: if only to make new combinations, and applying a set of rules on themusic, it would not be truly creative in my opinion quen Oh smiles Storm Nordwind: Biological machines as well as some on-the-edge physical or electronic ones do not act always the same every time. Noise gets into electronics. This means that probability of response plays a part, with all subsequent divergences of possible action streams Quintessential Sorbet: yes Fefonz...neural network computers are still quite new ...but I think the idea is to imitate brains neural networks....it's very interesting...alas..I'm far far far rom being an expert on it :-( TR Amat: So, self-awareness is a process of abstraction? Gilles Kuhn: well quen but creativeness depend of a a posteriori judgment made by people claiming to distinguish creation of copy.... arabella Ella: but quen that is your definition of creativity, some may claim it is sufficient to exhibit creativity quen Oh smiles at Storm and keeps believing she has not more complicated noise which she is taking as her own free will ;-) Storm Nordwind chuckles Fefonz Quan: yes quint, it's a nice idea, based on the overly simplified model of the brain as a big digital neuronal computer TR Amat: Consciousness is the reflexive modeling of self-awareness? arabella Ella: can a machine be aware of its own thinking and exhibit meta cognitive thinking? Archivist Llewellyn: Actually, the brain is more functional in terms of synaptic functions than neurons quen Oh: no Gilles, it depends on the capacity to really make something new, by applying new rules which you test and try to form something that is not yet existing and forms new right relations to everything you relate it to, no by judgment of others Gilles Kuhn: storm noise and non predictable behavior are component but only in the fact they are not predictable from an observer perspective I don’t think they are fundamental in an ontological one IF it is any sense to try to have an ontological perspective Quintessential Sorbet: arabella yes I think...you could argue that artificial neural networks have elementary metacognitive skills TR Amat: You could in theory model the sort of consciousness I just described in a computer. I think. Gilles Kuhn: look who say something is new quen? arabella Ella: yes Quint, the key is 'elementary' ... similar to language learning and primates quen Oh: the person that claims creativity, even if only one Quintessential Sorbet: Fefonz...to your earlier comment...sure the current neural network models are simplifications....but if you assume brain to be something essentially more....then I'm not sure anyone has been able to qualify what it could be TR Amat: Isn't part of the question whether you can create/develop a program that can go from the particular to the general, and then test that? Gilles Kuhn: and who impeach a non biological process to produce newness as you define it? Mickorod Renard: we may get a suitable answer from and when a AI joins into this debate Storm Nordwind applauds that notion! arabella Ella: yea Gilles Kuhn: hear hear mickrorod! if any can invite one :-))))))))))) TR Amat is in favor of trying to build/teach that AI... quen Oh: the fact that biological processes are as we know them orthogonal to all we experience when we choose, decide, relate, differ our non-physical perspectives Fefonz Quan: the tricky thing is - someone with the same complexity might act exactly the same, with no inner reflection at all! no Qualia etc. Fefonz Quan: though he will talk about it :) TR Amat: p-zombies rule... Or, was that drool. :) Gilles Kuhn: but the big problem is an ai would say or not say if you harm us do we not ....leak ? :-))))) Gilles Kuhn: quen they are not sorry quen Oh: perhaps not for you, but what makes you think that this is for others the case? Fefonz Quan: quen, I’m not sure i feel they are orthogonal Gilles Kuhn: we can influence all of your "will" process by administrating certain drugs etc...... quen Oh: influence perhaps, but can we not fight it too? Fefonz Quan: a little food, and i decide totally differently than when in hunger Gilles Kuhn: actually not Quintessential Sorbet: lol Fefonz. Quintessential Sorbet: me too Fefonz Quan: and I’m sure that serotonin got me going Gilles Kuhn: if you use sufficient biological influence on any brain you can totally change his behavior ... totally Fefonz Quan: not that it contrasts free will, just try to detail it further quen Oh: I think we can, and I plead we do, and for me it is crucial we keep taking the responsible perspective, not the biological cause-and-effect one Mickorod Renard: do we know exactly how these drugs affect the brain process? arabella Ella: well quen if we take a materialist or physicalist perspective i wonder whether responsibility eventually does go down the drain? Gilles Kuhn: yes perhaps quen but the bio one exist is possible to implement and actually we have a lot of reason to think the brains and so the conscious functional state are pure product and can be purely changed by this mean quen Oh: and in your view it seems essential we start to study to find what influence of the biological processes can open up our mind to keep it from sticking to patterns, judgments and to determine only every time again what is the most right relation from us to what we perceive over and over... Fefonz Quan: i didn't argue physicalism, just said that we should look more deeply to find exactly what we feel is non-physical here arabella Ella: what you are saying Gilles could exonerate criminals quen Oh: that drug would save the planet, cause world peace and make life more agreeable on earth Gilles Kuhn: and that don’t preclude free will ethic discussion provided we define what is a normal "environmental environment" for a brain /mind Gilles Kuhn: no ara Quintessential Sorbet: Ï suppose sex offenders are already somewhere made use drugs....that change their behavior Gilles Kuhn: and agreed quen gamze Burnstein: selam gamze Burnstein (Q-Translator tr-&gt;en): hallo Quintessential Sorbet: hi Gamze! Quintessential Sorbet: you can sit on my lap if you like Gilles Kuhn: agreed on your previous quen not on your drug sarcasm .... mosqitoo Clowes: askimm mosqitoo Clowes: adam mosqitoo Clowes: kucma otur gamze Burnstein: aa mosqitoo Clowes: dedi gamze Burnstein: özür dilerim :) gamze Burnstein (Q-Translator tr-&gt;en): sorry:) mosqitoo Clowes: heyy man gamze Burnstein: bos görünüyordu gamze Burnstein (Q-Translator tr-&gt;en): seemed empty mosqitoo Clowes: she don’t like Gilles Kuhn: well lady and gentlemen shall we call it a night?

mosqitoo Clowes: she is my wife Quintessential Sorbet: hmm empty? *raises eyebrow Fefonz Quan: (and I thought I misunderstood some of the language here beforehand :)) Gilles Kuhn: the discussion was passionate fun and most interesting! TR Amat: Maybe the shouter is a chatbot? :) gamze Burnstein: ya mosqi bu elimdeki niye gitmiyor? gamze Burnstein (Q-Translator tr-&gt;en): or qi that is not in my hand, why go? mosqitoo Clowes: 2bilmiom ki Fefonz Quan: does he feel qualia? arabella Ella: I think AI is here now Quintessential Sorbet: lol Gilles Kuhn: yes Turkish one probably ;-) quen Oh: until I got very good proof of that Gilles, I keep open the much more interesting option that at least we are so infinitely more complex biological processes that we cannot begin to even think we could describe them accurately by using all we know of biology and physics... and for that I maintain that the concept of free will and responsibility are very useful TR Amat: I think AI needs considerable work. TR Amat: But, crude robots with AI are on the rise. Fefonz Quan agee with quen arabella Ella agrees with quen Gilles Kuhn: agreed quen and I defend at a certain level of explanation and for ethic problems the artificial notion of free will Quintessential Sorbet: Well...my take is that I didn't see any theoretical hinder for us moving to robot space =) Fefonz Quan: though those can be complementary, not contradictive Quintessential Sorbet: btw...do you believe in dualism...that there is a soul...separate from our Avis!!! Gilles Kuhn: but for me free mean at a certain level of explanation and model not in an absolute way TR Amat is in favor of non-destructive uploading. :) Storm Nordwind bids farewell and sneaks away Myna Maven: Enjoyed it. I will be on my way. Later. quen Oh: lol Quint the comparison of our ava's and the soul our rl operators forms is interesting arabella Ella: bye Storm Fefonz Quan: bye Storm Gilles Kuhn: bye storm bye myna arabella Ella: thanks Gilles very interesting quen Oh: bye Storm Mickorod Renard: bye storm Quintessential Sorbet: bye arabella Ella: bye everyone! Gilles Kuhn: bye ara Fefonz Quan: Quint, our Avi's not like us, have souls obviously :-) Scathach Rhiadra: bye Ara Gilles Kuhn: thanks for coming! Fefonz Quan: bye Ara quen Oh: you too Gilles Mickorod Renard: bye All, thank you. Scathach Rhiadra: bye Mick Fefonz Quan: bye Mick Gilles Kuhn: bye mick Quintessential Sorbet: Fefonz....don’t tell me you believe that you believe in that crap that we actually have souls... that live after we log off from SL?!!! Gilles Kuhn: LOL quint ! Quintessential Sorbet: :-) Scathach Rhiadra: :) quen Oh smiles Fefonz Quan: sure, and come back tomorrow for their second life :)) Quintessential Sorbet: yea...the old myths say that our souls go to a place called "meatspace" Fefonz Quan: meat, yeah Quintessential Sorbet: but no scientific mind would accept such ludicrous old tales :-) Scathach Rhiadra: good night all, great discussion :) Gilles Kuhn: bye scatach Fefonz Quan: Night Scath :) quen Oh: goodnight Scathach quen Oh: where do vegetarian souls go...? Fefonz Quan: and when they teleport - no duplicates. Q E D Quintessential Sorbet: right exactly! Fefonz Quan: to the stomac, quen? Quintessential Sorbet: I don't believe the existence of this meatspace...unless I get concrete proof! Gilles Kuhn: so for people not already group member don’t hesitate to im me to get a group invite quen Oh: reincarnation would be meatspace?? carne = flesh Fefonz Quan: :) Quintessential Sorbet: yes...it would have to be quen Oh grins quen Oh: nice Quintessential Sorbet: well...it was my first time here....VERY interesting...ty for letting me join Quintessential Sorbet: good night all! quen Oh: bye, don't forget to join the group Quint. Fefonz Quan: so all those claiming the soul is different from the flesh - got it all around :) Gilles Kuhn: and for all too dont hesitate to go to our google group [|http://groups.google.com/group/philosophical-seminar] quen Oh: I think we have still kept the separation, only it goes from one meatspace dimension to the other Fefonz Fefonz Quan: "until we meat again.... to doo doom"

quen Oh: so don't worry after your meatspace there will be more ;-) quen Oh: hahaha TR Amat: There is some evidence of information not just dependent on physical memory, being transferred... quen Oh: mmm that song gets a whole other meaning now Fefonz Quan: exactly :) Fefonz Quan: it was a very enjoyable conversation, thank you all and Gilles, for sure quen Oh: thank you too Fefonz, I agree Fefonz Quan: so till we meat again, fare well :) quen Oh: bye Fefonz, would not mind to meet again :-) Gilles Kuhn: bye Fefonz oops late on that I m afraid quen Oh: :-)